


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
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CAMBODIA: The Communists have returned to the offensive in Kompong Cham Province.

In their most significant military action since late August, enemy troops launched a series of simultaneous attacks on government positions in and near Kompong Cham city yesterday. The heaviest fighting apparently was at the city's airfield, where three Khmer Krom battalions were forced to call for air strikes. The Communists also reportedly attacked the city's university. In addition, Tonle Bet and two nearby villages on the east side of the Mekong were subjected to enemy ground probes. Few details were available on any of these actions, however.

Northwest of Kompong Cham, preliminary government reports state that the enemy killed 24 Cambodian soldiers and wounded 20 in capturing the town of Troeung at the crossroads of Routes 7 and 21.

The last major Communist attacks in the Kompong Cham area were in late May. Since then, the government has improved and strengthened the defenses of Kompong Cham city. It is still too early to tell if these latest attacks signal the opening round in the Communists' dry season campaign. They may be designed in part to help forestall further Cambodian advances north and east of Route 6. [redacted]

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EGYPT-LIBYA-SUDAN: The proposed "union" of the three countries will face a number of problems before it is fully realized.

Following several days of meetings in Cairo between the chiefs of state of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan, it was announced on Sunday that they had decided to draw up a preliminary plan to lay the groundwork for the "establishment of a union of the three countries." As part of this effort it was decided to form "a unified, tripartite command of the three heads of state to work to expedite and promote integration." Other lower-level committees were also formed to further coordination and integration in a number of fields.

There has been closer cooperation among the three countries over the past year, including diplomatic, military, and some economic coordination. Few tangible steps toward political unity have been taken, however. It is still not clear what form of eventual union is contemplated; the collapse of the unitary state established between Syria and Egypt in 1958 is probably well remembered in Cairo. If the agreement to effect political union between the three countries were in fact carried out, it might take the form of a loose federation such as that established between Egypt and Yemen in 1958.

Egyptian President Sadat no doubt hopes that his stature will be increased by participation in a unity scheme that Nasir presumably had blessed. He may also hope that closer cooperation with Libya will allow for more ready access to Tripoli's oil-rich coffers. The Sudan's Numayri and Libya's Qaddafi might be sincere in their pursuit of Arab unity, but they could also hope that closer cooperation with Egypt will strengthen their somewhat shaky domestic positions. This new agreement, however,

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could have the reverse effect by further alienating those in both Libya and the Sudan who are fearful of Egyptian hegemony.

In any event, it will take some time to resolve all of the difficult problems that must be faced before any significant degree of political unity can be achieved. [redacted]


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OAU Assistance to African Insurgency



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AFRICA: Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) this year increased their contributions to African insurgent movements trying to overthrow minority governments. They remained, however, second to Communist countries as a source of aid to the guerrillas.

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[redacted] member states contributed about \$900,000 to the insurgent groups during fiscal year 1970. This represents an increase of about \$300,000 over last year and ends a steady decline in contributions over the past several years, in spite of severe criticism of the aid program by some OAU members. This year's increase stems primarily from larger donations from states that contribute regularly, rather than from a greater number of states contributing.

Only seven African governments have paid all or nearly all of the assessments since the aid program began in 1964. Three others have paid their assessments for the last three years. Most of the remaining 30 African states have made only token contributions.

The amount of Communist aid to African insurgent groups is unknown, but it is clear that the insurgents continue to rely on Communist sources for the bulk of their military needs. For example, the Soviets probably contribute \$150,000 to \$300,000 yearly to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). OAU assistance to the MPLA this year totaled only about \$45,000, plus the use of OAU training, storage, and transport facilities. Insurgent groups in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea also receive similar amounts of Communist aid.

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EAST GERMANY - YUGOSLAVIA: Two East German officials visited Belgrade last week to resume party contacts broken off two years ago.

This initiative apparently was part of Pankow's effort to improve relations with all East European regimes in order to buttress its position in negotiations with Bonn. The East German exercise is largely cosmetic but, for the first time since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht's emissaries in effect have conceded that their Communist neighbors have a right to differing views on matters of importance to their individual parties. This stratagem has gained Pankow at least minimum support for its negotiating position vis-a-vis Bonn. In the case of Yugoslavia, Belgrade's support thus far has been only lukewarm.

A plan for cooperation in 1971 between the East German and Yugoslav parties was drafted while the East Germans were in Belgrade. It is doubtful that this type of cooperation will ever get beyond the ritualistic stage, and relations certainly will never be as good as those maintained between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the West German Social Democrats.

For their part, the Yugoslavs would like to resume contacts with all East European parties. Except for Romania, such contacts had until very recently been virtually nonexistent since 1968. Between 25 October and 3 November, for example, the Yugoslavs hosted the first Czechoslovak party delegation to visit Belgrade since Dubcek was ousted.

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NOTES

CUBA - TRINIDAD and TOBAGO: Havana continues to cultivate carefully its Caribbean neighbors. In a follow-up to the visit of a group of agricultural specialists to Port of Spain last September, Cuba has given 42 head of cattle to the government of Trinidad and Tobago. A spokesman for Trinidad and Tobago's Ministry of Agriculture says that no formal intergovernmental agreement exists between the two countries, but he has expressed the hope that his country will collaborate with Havana on agricultural matters in the future. Fidel Castro has been trying to project a favorable image throughout the Caribbean in hopes of persuading his neighbors to establish full commercial and diplomatic relations.

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PHILIPPINES: Western Europe's response to the World Bank's proposed Philippine Consultative Group, a consortium of major aid donors, has been generally lukewarm. The group was intended to help finance Manila's development program as well as ease its balance-of-payments problems by providing substantial amounts of aid. West Germany apparently is not interested in joining at all, and the Netherlands and Switzerland will join only as observers. Bonn's refusal may well discourage other prospective European members from taking part. Japan, however, seems interested and probably will participate.

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